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Public School Financing in the United 
States: More on the Dark Side 
of Intermediate Structures 
John C. Reitz* 
Like Professor Inoue's article, The Poverty of Rights-Blind 
Communality: Looking Through the Window of Japan,' this 
article provides evidence of the dark side of intermediate 
structures. The intermediate structure-that is, the social and 
political structure standing between the individual and the 
state-which this article describes is the local public school 
board and its associated property taxing district. The dark side 
of this structure is the persistence of extraordinary inequities 
in public school financing. These inequalities persist because 
local funding through public school districts has been 
considered vital to ensure local control over schools, and local 
control has been considered to outweigh the interest in equality 
of funding. This negative aspect of local school boards seems all 
the darker because local control by the school boards has 
proven largely illusory. Although local school districts may be 
thought to mediate between the individual and the state in 
positive ways, their actual role in public school finance has 
come to be one of preventing the sigmficant wealth transfers 
that are necessary to provide even rough equality in public 
educatioa2 
* Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. The author gratefully 
acknowledges helpful discussions with innumerable colleagues and friends, research 
advice and comments on written drafts by colleagues Eric Andersen, William G. 
Buss, and Larry Ward, as well as research assistance on German law from 
her ma^ Piinder, none of whom, however, are to be blamed for the author's 
opinions and errors. Unless otherwise noted, translations are by the author. 
1. 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 517. 
2. There is a substantial body of literature discussing whether there is any 
demonstrable correlation between expenditures on education and students' 
educational achievement. See MARK G. YUWF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL PO ICY AND 
THE LAW 596-99 (3d ed. 1992). With respect to the magnitude of disparities 
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There are signs of change on the horizon. A number of 
states, partly under the pressure of litigation, are increasing 
state-wide funding of education in order to reduce, if not 
eliminate, funding disparities. However, this article argues that 
in rectifying the problem of inequality in public school finance, 
i t  will not be possible to restore significant control over schools 
to the local school boards. Increased state funding is required 
in order to reduce funding disparities, and an increase in state 
funding seems very likely to accentuate the current trend 
toward increased state control over the schools. Voucher plans, 
which in effect "marketize" education by giving students and 
their families some choice about which school t o  attend, may 
appear to offer an attractive alternative t o  centralized state 
control over schools, but marketizing also seems sure to 
weaken the role of the school boards and the political processes 
that play out before them. If there is any hope for meaningful 
community control over schools of the future, that control is 
likely to come in the form of local advisory councils to the 
individual schools, a structure that obviously cannot be given 
the taxing power. Thus the thesis of this article is that the 
putative benefits of local control over the public schools can no 
longer justify a system of school financing that permits 
disparities in district wealth to result in sigmficant disparities 
in the tax revenues available to each district for education. 
This article pursues this argument as follows. Section I1 
outlines the current system of local funding, the disparities 
that result, and the benefits to society that are thought to 
result from the system of local school board control. The section 
concludes with a critical examination of these supposed 
benefits. Section I11 describes the litigation that has challenged 
the current funding system. Section IV examines, with the help 
of a sidelong glance a t  Germany, the prospects for meaningful 
control by local school boards if centralized state funding is 
substantially increased for the sake of equality. This section 
highlights the tension between the principles of local control 
discussed in this article, it strains credulity to claim that educational opportunity 
is not affected. See i n j h  notes 7-8 and accompanying text. More importantly, 
however, doubts about the correlation provide no rationale for dismissing equality 
concerns. The claim of equality is not limited to academic achievement but includes 
the general treatment of each student. A disparate allocation of public funds to the 
rich is simply unjust. Grossly disparate funding of the public schools is an afFront 
to the dignity of the disadvantaged individuals and may produce serious social and 
psychological harm. 
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and equal treatment. It also describes current efforts to 
enhance local control at the level of individual public schools. 
Section V discusses "marketization" plans for the public 
schools, the impact such plans are likely to have on school 
boards, and the dynamics of their political processes. Section VI 
concludes that the benefits of the traditional self-governing and 
self-supporting school district cannot be salvaged and that the 
United States should abandon the effort to do so in order to 
provide a meaningful degree of equality in the vital areas of 
primary and secondary education. 
11. THE SYSTEM OF LOCAL FINANCING AND 
THE RESULTING DISPARITIES 
Historically, most public schools in the United States were 
chiefly financed by local property taxes. With the exception of 
Hawaii, public schools in the United States still receive a 
significant portion of their funds from property taxes that are 
locally assessed and ~ollected.~ On average, as a rough 
estimate, about half of the funding comes from the local 
communities and half from the state: with the federal 
contribution remaining consistently smalL5 For example, in 
the late 1970s the average local contribution to public school 
budgets was sixty percent of nonfederal funding, with the 
states providing the other forty percent. In the 1980s the local 
share dropped t o  forty-six percent of the nonfederal funding. 
More recently, the local share has been on the rise.6 
The combination of state and local fmancing for public 
schools produces marked disparities in funding. Some of the 
disparity is due to substantial differences in the level of wealth 
in the various states. For example, in 1988 Connecticut public 
schools spent an average of $6230 per pupil while Mississippi 
spent an average of $2548,' a difference of about two and one- 
half times. But the variations between public school funding in 
different districts of one state show even greater disparities. 
3. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 2, at 592. 
4. However, a tremendous variation on this point from state to state exists. 
For example, in 1984-85, New Hampshire secured 93% of its public school funding 
from local taxes and only 7% from state revenues, while California presented 
virtually the reverse picture, with 9.4% local funding and 90.6% state funding. Id. 
5. Id. at 674 (in 1980 the federal share of primary and secondary education 
expenditures was 8.7%; by 1988, it had dropped to 6.2%). 
6. Id. at 592. 
7. Id. at 591. 
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"In many states, the level of spending in one district within a 
state is often three o r  four times that of another district within 
the state. There are extremes where the differences are as 
great as twenty to one or more."8 
States have historically attempted to alleviate the 
intrastate discrepancies with some form of state equalization 
laws, with the result that all states provide some state funding 
to the public schools. But these attempts to equalize funding 
have not proved successful. The disparities reported above 
reflect the financial situation after state equalization. As 
Professors Yudof, Kxp, and Levin comment: 
[Tlhe equalizing effect [of state equalization laws] is often not 
strong, even when these formulas are not encumbered by 
special provisions added for political reasons. Typically, 
however, legislatures have added "save harmless" provisions 
t o  their formulas that, for example, guarantee districts the 
same amount of aid they received the prior year even though 
a straight application of the formula would indicate a 
lowering of state aid for that district in the coming year. In 
short, the formulas in practice have the effect of maintaining 
the disparities among districts in the amount of money spent 
per pupil.g 
A. The Arguments for Local Funding 
The arguments in favor of local funding for public schools 
are all rooted in the alleged virtues of local control, which cover 
two basic areas: control over the schools themselves, and con- 
trol over the taxes levied to fmance the public schools. The 
control structure is the local school board. Each local school 
board is in charge of a school district, which forms a single 
taxing district as well. The board consists of members who are 
8. Id. at 592. For a passionate description of what these Werences mean to 
the students involved, see JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUAL~MES (1991). Kozol 
concludes: 
If Americans had to discriminate directly against other people's 
children, I believe most citizens would find this morally abhorrent. Denial, 
in an active sense, of other people's children is, however, rarely necessary 
in this nation. Inequality is mediated for us by a taxing system that most . 
people do not fully understand and seldom scrutinize. 
Id. at 207. 
9. YUDOF El' AL., supra note 2, at 594. See also KOZOL, supra note 8, at 209 
("[Tlhe various 'formulas' conceived-and reconceived each time there is a legal 
challenge--to achieve some equity in public education have been almost total 
failures."). 
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locally elected in the great majority of cases.'' Locally raised 
funding for the school district is an important way of assuring 
the independence of the school board, so the argument goes, so 
that it can function as a truly intermediate structure rather 
than a mere agent of the state. The disparities produced by 
local financing are thus seen as the price that has to be paid to 
secure the benefits of local control. 
Locally raised funding even more obviously preserves the 
second aspect of local control-the power to determine the level 
of tax burden. Local financing of public schools gives the voters 
of an individual school district control over a segment of their 
tax burden by allowing the voters to decide the amount of prop- 
erty tax they wish to devote to public school education. 
The arguments in favor of local control over the schools 
and the taxes levied to finance them track the benefits to soci- 
ety generally asserted to  result from healthy intermediate 
structures." First, local school boards and local property tax 
funding serve as a buffer against control by the state, permit- 
ting local communities to determine the level of their own com- 
mitment to public education and to control how the tax money 
is spent. Second, the local school boards provide a "school for 
citizenship," training citizens to run the larger democracies of 
state and federal governments by first giving them opportuni- 
ties to manage an important affair on the local level. Third, the 
local school district provides a "seedbed for republican virtues" 
by creating a local forum in which citizens can practice the 
skills of advocacy and compromise necessary to the successful 
governance of the larger units of state and nation. Fourth, the 
system of local control and funding teaches individuals inde- 
pendence from government because the local school district is 
small enough to make many citizens appreciate their direct 
responsibility for the quality of the public schools. Fifth, local 
control is more likely than state or federal control to produce a 
humane delivery of educational services that is attuned to local 
concerns. Finally, local control over the public schools and their 
financing increases the individual's sense of participation in 
10. Some local school hoards are appointed, but 85% are elected locally. FRED- 
ERICK M. WIRT & MICHAEL W. KIRST, SCHOOLS IN CONFLICT: THE POLITICS OF 
EDUCATION 94 (1982). 
11. See Mary A. Glendon, General Report, Individualism and Communitarianism 
in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 385, 390-91 nn. 14-18 and accompanying text. 
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society because each individual has a relatively greater chance 
of affecting locally made decisions than decisions made at the 
state or federal level. 
B. Criticisms of the Local Control Arguments 
There are substantial problems with the control arguments 
for local financing. First, many of the supposed benefits of local 
control over education are not in fact observable today, and 
local control over education has been greatly narrowed, perhaps 
to the vanishing point. Second, local control over the tax bur- 
den for financing public schools is not significant today in light 
of the much larger state and federal tax burdens, and the free- 
dom to determine their own level of tax support for public 
schools is largely illusory for many districts.12 Both of these 
objections raise doubts as to whether local financing, with its 
attendant interdistrict inequalities, protects anything of value. 
A number of features concerning the operation of local 
school boards suggests that the benefits of local control may not 
be worth the price exacted by the inequality created in our 
system of local fmance. The school boards have proven, for 
example, to be rather poor "schools for citizenship." School 
board elections have notoriously low voter turnout; voters dis- 
play "even more indifference [for local school board elections] 
than that for other government offices."13 This apathy may 
stem from the fact that school board elections are nonpartisan, 
often unopposed, or held at inconvenient dates. However, it is 
clear that "campaigning in school contests is very limited, can- 
didate visibility is very low, and the contest [is] rarely based on 
specific poli~ies."~~ While public participation before the 
boards on important issues may be vigorous, it is unclear 
whether interested parties would be any less likely to partici- 
pate if such hearings were held by a state agency instead of a 
local school board, as long as the hearings were held in a place 
accessible to  the local parties. 
Even more problematic for the arguments in favor of local 
fmancing is the fact that the school boards are increasingly 
losing control over the substance of education. All state consti- 
12. Unlike the similar arguments that were advanced in Serrano v. Priest, 487 
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), my arguments are not addressed to the issue of constitu- 
tionality, but solely to the issue of sound social policy and general fairness. 
13. WIRT & IClRfT, supra note 10, at 95. 
14. Id. 
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tutions give the state legislature plenary authority over public 
education.15 State governments exercise substantial control 
over such basic questions as the rules for teacher certification 
and tenure, collective bargaining, basic curriculum require- 
ments, and the number of days school is to be in session.16 
Since 1983 a flood of state statutes has greatly narrowed the 
discretion left to local officials regarding basic school opera- 
tions. There are now, for example, state statutes regulating 
participation in sports, the quality and quantity of homework, 
how much time is to  be devoted to each subject each day, and 
what topics each class must cover.17 Some state statutes even 
govern how often announcements may be made over the school 
intercom system.18 In addition, numerous state and federal 
welfare requirements further diminish local discretion over the 
allocation of funds for education.lg 
Of course, the situation may vary from state to  state, but 
the trend everywhere is unmistakable-an increase in central- 
ized control at the expense of control by the local school boards. 
15. MARTHA M. MCCARTHY & NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL 
LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 2 (3d ed. 1992). 
16. Thomas B. Timar & David L. Kirp, Educational Reform and Institutional 
Compefence, 57 HARV. EDUC. REV. 308, 309 (1987); see generally Charles F.  Faber, 
Is Local Control of the Schools Still a Viable Option?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 
447, 449-52 (1991) (reviewing the growth of state control of education). 
In some states, even the textbooks have to be approved by the state. In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice Mar- 
shall said in his dissenting opinion: 
In Texas, statewide laws regulate in fact the most minute details of 
local public education. For example, the State prescribes required courses. 
All textbooks must be submitted for state approval, and only approved 
textbooks may be used. The State has established the qualiGcations neces- 
sary for teaching in Texas public schools and the procedures for obtaining 
certification. The State has even legislated on the length of the school 
day. 
Id. at 126-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
17. Timar & Kiip, supm note 16, at  309. 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Johanne A. Presser, Frustrations on the Board, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 
14, 1992, at  11, 11, stating her personal observations: 
As a school-board member I am caught between the ever-increasing 
number of state and federal mandates and the ever-dimininhing funding. 
The state dictates graduation requirements and the minimum time to be 
spent on subjects at  the elementary level. AIDS prevention has been 
added, but the state insists it be separate from other compulsory drug 
and health curricula. Specialeducation statutes require costly individual- 
ized educational plans for the mentally, physically and learning-disabled. 
Failure to comply with these regulations invites lawsuits, hearings and, 
ultimately, withdrawal of state funding. 
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As Doyle and Finn wrote almost ten years ago: 
"[Llocal control of public education" as traditionally conceived 
is in reality disappearing, even though its facade is nearly 
everywhere intact. What appears to be happening is that local 
school systems are evolving in practice into something that 
they always were in a constitutional sense: subordinate ad- 
ministrative units of a state educational system, with some 
residual power to modify statewide regulations and proce- 
dures in order to ease their implementation within a particu- 
lar community, and with the residual authority (in most 
states, though not all) to supplement state spending with 
locally raised revenues.'' 
Nor is local control over the tax burden of the citizens of 
the local school district very sigruficant because the local prop- 
erty tax burden pales in comparison to other state and federal 
tax burdens, especially for income taxes.21 The local district 
cannot even claim to control the tax burdens attributable solely 
to public school financing because on average state funds con- 
stitute roughly half of a school district's operating funds.22 
More importantly, local control over the tax burden is often 
cruelly illusory for the poorest school districts. The school dis- 
tricts that have the least valuable taxable property often have 
the highest property tax rates, yet the school taxes they raise 
fall far short of the amounts raised by the most affluent school 
districts that use lower tax rates.23 Poor school districts are 
thus restrained from determining the level of expenditures for 
20. Denis P. Doyle & Chester E. Finn, Jr., American Schools and the Future of 
Local Control, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1984, at 77, 90. 
21. Property taxes have been declining significantly as a proportion of the total 
tax burden in this country. In 1902, property taxes constituted 41% of all tax reve- 
nues raised by all forms of government tax in this country. In 1955, property taxes 
accounted for 10%; and in 1989, property taxes raised a mere 7.4% of the total tax 
revenue. State and federal personal income taxes now account for the largest block 
of tax revenue, 28.3% of the total in both 1955 and 1989. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUB- 
LIC FINANCE 23 & fig. 2.2 (3d ed. 1992). 
22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
23. For example, in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (Cal. 19711, the 
school district with the highest expenditures per pupil in California in 1968-69 
applied a property tax rate of only $2.38 per $100 of property valuation, while the 
school district with the lowest per pupil expenditures taxed itself at the rate of 
$5.48 per $100. Similarly, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1973), the school district with the highest expenditures per 
pupil in Texas in 1967-68 taxed itself at the rate of $0.85 per $100, and the school 
district with the lowest expenditures per pupil taxed itself at  the rate of $1.05 per 
$100, the highest rate in the San Antonio metropolitan area. 
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schools. As the California Supreme Court said in Serrano v. 
Priest: 
CSlo long as the assessed valuation within a district's bound- 
aries is a major determinant of how much it can spend for its 
schools, only a district with a large tax base will be truly able 
to decide how much it really cares about education. The poor 
district cannot freely choose to tax itself into an excellence 
which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far from being necessary 
to promote local fiscal choice, the present financing system 
actually deprives the less wealthy districts of that option.24 
Instead of protecting meaningful choice about the level of 
tax support for public education, the system of local financing 
operates primarily to prevent the kind of wealth transfers be- 
tween wealthy and poor districts necessary to achieve greater 
equality in public school funding. The system of local financing 
may also result in inadequate overall funding for public educa- 
tion. In one sense this is true axiomatically. Since the adequacy 
of educational funding for one set of students depends to a 
large extent on the level of funding for other sets of students 
(who will be in social and economic competition with them), 
inequality-particularly severe inequality-in funding neces- 
sarily constitutes "inadequate" funding for the disadvantaged 
students. 
In a related manner, one can argue that leaving the choice 
about the level of tax support for public education to such a 
small political unit as the school district ensures that the total 
amount of taxes raised for public schools is lower than it would 
be if school taxes were raised on a state-wide basis. If schools 
were financed on a state-wide basis with equal per-student 
distribution of tax dollars to all school districts,25 it seems 
likely that the average voters would not be satisfied with the 
level of school funding until their students-and hence all 
students-received at least the same funds as the "average 
24. Sermrw, 487 P.2d at 1260. For specific details concerning the lack of choice 
available to school boards in poor districts, see KOZOL, supra note 8, at 212 pas- 
sim. 
25. However, the level of taxes that would be raised by state-*de financing 
might be lower where there is massive flight out of the public schools because 
such a flight is likely to weaken the electorate's support for the public schools. 
Thus, in order for state-wide financing to reflect the level of financial commitment 
the state's population really wants to make to education, families should not be 
free to send their children to private schools. 
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studentyy now receives. To reach that level of funding for all 
students, significant increases in the present tax burden for 
education would probably be required. If that is so, the current 
system can be said to be underfunding the public schools. 
111. THE LITIGATION 'CHALLENGING THE DISPARITIES 
The gross disparities in funding between school districts of 
the same state have prompted a wave of litigation. As of Sep- 
tember 1992, twenty-three states faced litigation over public 
school financing.26 The plaintiffs in these cases generally raise 
two different claims. The most common claim is that the in- 
equalities in public school finance violate the equal protection 
clauses of both federal and state constitutions. In 1971, the 
California Supreme Court accepted this argument in the land- 
mark case of Serrano v. Prie~t.~' The flood of litigation that 
Serrano unleashed in other states was dismissed from federal 
courts by the United States Supreme Court's 1973 decision in 
Sun Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigue~?~ which 
established that the inequalities in public school finance do not 
violate the federal Equal Protection Clause. Rodriguez, howev- 
er, does not prevent state supreme courts from ruling, as in the 
Serrano case, that state equal protection clauses forbid such 
inequality in public school funding. School finance litigation 
has therefore been concentrated in state courts. Most of the 
pending suits include claims under state equal protection claus- 
e ~ . ~ ~  The supreme courts of at least six states have disagreed 
with the Serrano analysis and rejected state equal protection 
claims,3' while at least two state supreme courts have agreed 
with Serrano?l 
26. William Celis 3 4  23 States h e  Suits on S c W  Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2, 1992, at B7. 
27. 487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971). ARer remanding the case for a trial on 
the merits, the court in Senam 11, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977) upheld the lower 
court's determination that the public school financing system violated the California 
Constitution's equal protection provisions. 
28. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
29. Celis, supra note 26, at B7. 
30. See Shofstd v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lujan v. Colorado State 
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 
(Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 k 2 d  758 (Md. 1983); 
Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); 
Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 19741, overruled on 
other grounds by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
31. See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Washakie County Sch. 
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The second claim in the public school financing cases is one 
that can only be asserted under state constitutions, many of 
which include language explicitly obligating the state legisla- 
ture to provide a "thorough and efficienty' public school system. 
The seminal case was a 1973 decision issued by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahi11,32 which held that New 
Jersey's system of public school financing failed to provide a 
"thorough and efficient" public school system. The court rea- 
soned that the large disparities in funding resulting from reli- 
ance on local taxation indicated that the poor districts were 
receiving inadequate funding.33 Although this theory initially 
found little favor in other states, by the end of 1990 four other 
state supreme courts had followed New Jersey's lead in finding 
that a system of public school financing which relies too heavily 
on local funding fails to provide "adequate" funding to achieve 
the goal of a "thorough" or "efficientyy public school system.34 
This ''adequacy" argument also figures prominently in most of 
the pending cases.s5 
Under the pressure of these lawsuits, a number of states 
have modified their method of public school fmancing to pro- 
vide a larger role for state funding in an attempt to minimize 
disparities that result from local funding. While it is still too 
Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.),'cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
32. 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973). The Robinson case returned to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court six more times and resulted in passage of the first New Jersey 
state income tax. In Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129, 136-38 (NJ. 1976), the court 
somewhat reformulated the constitutional requirement to emphasize that a mini- 
mum level of educational opportunity for all was required, not necessarily equality 
of spending for all students. The cases are summarized and discussed in YUDOF ET 
AL., supm note 2, at 644-45. 
In 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court once again relied on the "thorough 
and efficient" clause to find that the large interdistrict disparities in public school 
funding that remained even under the New Jersey system as revised in the wake 
of the Robinson litigation still violated the state constitution. The court interpreted 
the "thorough and efficient" clause to require the state to provide equalization 
payments to the poorer urban districts so that, despite local financing, their educa- 
tional expenditures per pupil would be substantially equivalent to those of the 
more afnuent suburban districts and so that their special disadvantages would be 
addressed. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
33. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295-97 (NJ. 1973). 
34. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hele- 
na Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Edgewood 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood ZZ), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). The cases are discussed in YUDOF 
ET AL., supra note 2, at  645-48. 
35. Celis, supra note 26, at B7. 
634 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I1993 
early to determine whether the manifestly unequal system of 
local finance for the public school will be eradicated, a modest 
trend appears to be emerging to reduce these inequalities by 
increasing the amount of state funding.36 
Intermediate structures are neither intrinsically good nor 
bad. The foregoing discussion suggests that they can have ei- 
ther effect, perhaps even both a t  the same time. Comparative 
work in this area may help us better appreciate the double- 
edged quality of intermediate structures. I do not claim to have 
conducted any serious comparative study in the area of primary 
and secondary public education, but a superficial glance at one 
foreign model is instructive. It suggests that there is a strong 
link between funding and control. If that is so, then equality of 
funding is inevitably in strong tension with local control. 
A. The Germun System 
From the standpoint of equality of educational opportunity, 
the German example appears laudable. The Germans see their 
commitment to equal educational opportunities as stemming, 
not so much from the equal protection clause of their constitu- 
ti0n,3~ as from their constitutionally enshrined decision to 
make Germany a welfare state (Sozial~taat) .~~ Equality in 
public school finance is assured in part by relying on the Llind- 
er, the German version of federal states, t o  finance the schools. 
While there is some local component of public school finance, 
principally for school buildings, the bulk of funds for the 
schools comes from each Land, including virtually all teacher 
salaries.39 The Germans carry their commitment to equality 
in funding so far that their constitution exempts from constitu- 
tional protection the right to establish private schools that 
36. The New Yo& Times mentions West Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky as 
having taken the lead in equalizing public &hod financing. by (1) increasing the 
amount of taxes raised at the state level, (2) imposing a cap on how much rich 
districts may raise locally for their schools, and (3) increasing the amount of state 
aid dispensed to schools, with larger allocations going to the poorer districts. Id. 
37. GRUNDGESE~Z [Constitution] [GG] art. 3 (F.R.G.). 
38. Thomas Opperma~, Bildung, in BESONDERES VERWALTUNGSREC~ 625 
(Hugo von Miinch ed., 5th ed. 1979). 
39. Id. at 643-44. 
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would promote a division of students according to the wealth of 
their parents.40 As a matter of fact, private schools have even 
been found constitutionally entitled to receive state subsidies in 
certain cases t o  eliminate inequality between public and pri- 
vate finan~ing.~' 
The German system is also characterized by thorough state 
(Land) control over education. The influence of local communi- 
ties is limited primarily to relatively peripheral issues like the 
opening, closing, and location of school buildings. The state 
alone controls choice and level of educational materials, as well 
as the qualifications of teachers. The general principle is that 
"the local community builds the (school) house, but the state is 
the master of the In the United States, as already 
discussed, the trend has been to decrease substantially the 
degree of local control. The shift in the United States toward 
greater degrees of state control may have developed for a vari- 
ety of factors unconnected with funding, not the least of which 
is the steady loss of cohesion in our local comrn~nities,4~ but 
the German example suggests that control over content of edu- 
cation also tends to be linked to funding. As we move to greater 
state funding in order to overcome the disparities that result 
from local funding, it seems likely that we will also inexorably 
move toward ever greater state control over the substance of 
e d u ~ a t i o n . ~ ~  
B. Increasing State Control over Education 
Increasing state control over education might have its 
positive side. The recent success of the "adequacy" claim in 
public school finance litigation shows that beyond the issue of 
equality lurks the issue of whether U.S. society is devoting an 
adequate level of resources to primary and secondary educa- 
40. G R U N D G E ~  [Constitution] [GG] art. 7, qI 4 (F.R.G.). 
41. Oppermann, supra note 38, at  648. 
42. Id. at  643. The Germans see the control of the Land over the substance of 
education as necessary to implement the equality of educational opportunity re- 
quired by their constitution. Id. 
43. Faber, supra note 16, at  468-69. 
44. The majority of the California Supreme Court denied this phenomenon in 
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). " N o  matter how the state decides to 
finance its system of public education, it can still leave this decision-making power 
in the hands of local districts." Id at  1260. While the court's statement is logically 
defensible, it seems that experience shows how unlikely it is that financial control 
will not be used to expand state power. 
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tion. As discussed in sections I1 and 111, local control over the 
level of school taxes has arguably resulted in inadequate over- 
all funding for most public schools. Moving to state-wide fi- 
nancing and control of education may be the only way to give 
those most concerned about education, especially the teachers 
and professional administrators, the visibility and organization 
t o  obtain a truly "adequate" expenditure for publicly funded 
primary and secondary schools.45 
In any event, it appears impossible to have both fairly- 
distributed, adequate resources and meaningful local control at  
the same time. The arguments linking local financing and local 
control thus have a rational basis: if there is any hope for local 
school boards to exercise meaningful control over the schools, it 
would appear to be necessary to safeguard the boards' power 
through local finance. The trend toward increasing state and 
federal control, however, suggests that there will be little 
chance for local school boards to exercise meaningful control 
over public education in the future. 
If the local school board no longer enjoys signifkant local 
control, then the disparities of local finance and the accompa- 
nying inequities are an unacceptable price to pay. Even in 
those states in which there is still substantial local school 
board control, enormous inequality in public school finance is 
an unacceptably high price to pay. The case law and legislative 
developments recounted in section I11 suggest that this percep- 
tion is spreading in the United States. Perhaps someday our 
system will look more like the German system, which a leading 
German commentator proudly describes as one that "guaran- 
tees 'in principle (dem Grunde nach)' the existence of an equal 
opportunity, fully developed educational system and forbids 
45. Cf. Larry G. Simon, T h  School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining 
and Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409, 423 (1973) (arguing that centraliza- 
tion of school Gnance will lead to the formation of powerful, state-wide teacher 
unions and an increase in collective bargaining at the state level, with the likely 
result that overall wages for teachers will rise). I t  should be noted that Professor 
Simon regarded the probable enhancement of teacher union power as more neg- 
ative than positive. He even seemed d regard it as undesirable that teachers' 
views on educational policy might become controlling, stating, "to the extent that 
state authorities lack the internalized norms which have tended to stiffen the resis- 
tance of local boards to teacher demands, there may be an increased tendency to 
regard teacher organizations as presumptively wrred on educational questions." Id. 
at 438. While Professor Simon appears to view this possibility with alarm, I would 
think that this kind of development may be necessary to attract good teachers to 
the public schools and especially to keep them in their jobs. 
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radical deviation from that p r i n ~ i p l e . ~ ~  Of course, implement- 
ing the principle of equality raises its own set of problems, as 
the nuances of the foregoing quotation seem to indicate.47 A 
true commitment to equality through state-wide funding would 
not end all litigation over school finan~e!~ But at this point, 
Americans cannot claim that our system of school finance guar- 
antees equal opportunity, even "in principle." 
The reasons why the United States has been unable to 
make a meaningful commitment to the principle of equality of 
educational opportunity are no doubt multiple. Perhaps some 
view the current system in quite Machiavellian terms as an  
acceptable cover for blatant discrimination against the poor. 
More likely, many are honestly persuaded by the appealing list 
of benefits of local control discussed above in section I1 and do 
not realize how illusory these benefits are. Clearly, the alterna- 
tive of centralized state control is unpalatable to large majori- 
ties in the United States!' Thus the tension between equality 
and local control creates a difficult conundrum. 
One reform which offers at least a partial way out of the 
conundrum involves moving the locus of local control from the 
district level to the level of the individual schools. Thus a num- 
ber of current reform proposals--often bearing the label "site- 
based managementn-involve transferring greater autonomy to 
the individual schools themselves, where councils representing 
the parents and guardians of students could play an advisory 
or even a governing role.50 "Site-based managementn would 
46. Oppermann, supra note 38, at  625. 
47. Even equality of expenditures per pupil, for example, may not create real 
equality of educational opportunity because children from the poorest segments of 
the population may be among those the most in need of special education. 
48. Cf. YUDoF ET AL., supra note 2, at  659-67 (describing issues and litigation 
concerning intradistrict inequalities). 
49. Cf. Mary A. Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 519, 525 (1992) ("[IN is almost obligatory for American politicians of both 
the right and the left to profess mistrust of government."). 
50. Professor Faber describes the "site-based management" systems adopted by 
Hawaii in 1989 and by Kentucky in 1990 and advocated elsewhere by a variety of 
scholars. Faber, supra note 16, at 469-72. These systems transfer authority to local 
schools and bring parent representatives into a council with teachers and adminis- 
trators to determine policies left to the individual schools. Despite his contention 
that "local school boards will not disappear, because they are too firmly entrenched 
and too well accepted by American culture," id. at 467, Professor Faber does not 
appear to advocate a very significant role for the district-wide school board. The 
"local control" for which he pleads appears to consist chiefly of the type of local 
control represented by "site-based management." See also YUDOF ET AL., supm note 
2, a t  451-58 (describing recent formation of similar local school councils in the Chi- 
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appear to create a quite different intermediate structure from 
the traditional district-wide school board. The school councils 
govern at most one school, not a whole district. As a conse- 
quence, while school councils may be given important budget- 
ary powers over their schools, they cannot be given the power 
to make budgetary decisions involving several schools, and it 
would clearly be impracticable to give each council taxing pow- 
er. Moreover, since the local school councils all include substan- 
tial representation-in some cases, even a majority-of teach- 
ers and administrators, unlike the traditional district-wide 
school boards, the school councils are much more likely to be 
dominated in the long-run by the professional educators. 
None of these observations is meant to be an argument 
against "site-based management." This approach arguably 
injects local influence or control a t  the level at which it is most 
appropriate. I merely wish to point out that the school councils 
will represent a much less independent level of self-governance 
than the district-wide school boards have traditionally aspired 
to. The nature of the political interaction will presumably be 
different, and consequently, the benefits to political culture to 
be expected from such intermediate structures should be more 
modest than those traditionally claimed for the district-wide 
school board. Most importantly, because the individual school is 
an impractically small taxing district, revitalization of local 
control at the level of individual schools would serve as no 
justification for continuing the present system of local financing 
of school districts. 
The other reform movement that may appear to offer a 
way out of the dilemma between equality of funding and local 
control over education is comprised of plans to marketize pri- 
mary and secondary education, generally through some kind of 
voucher system. AU of these proposals share the idea of forcing 
the public schools to compete for students, just as private 
schools presently do. Equality concerns can-and must-be 
addressed by providing public subsidies through "vouchers" for 
each student, thereby giving even the poorest students rough 
parity of "purchasing" power for education. The more expansive 
proposals would force the public schools to compete directly 
cap, Illinois area). 
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with the private schools by permitting the state vouchers to be 
"spent" at any school. This type of proposal could even be ac- 
companied by complete privatization of the public schools, 
though that may not be necessary or even wise. More modest 
versions of the marketization concept would simply force public 
schools to compete against each other by limiting state-provid- 
ed vouchers to the public schools. Some school districts, espe- 
cially in large urban areas, have already partially implemented 
this idea through the use of "magnet" schools, which accept 
applications from the entire school district and differentiate 
themselves from other schools in the district according to some 
specialty (like science) or special pedagogical approach.51 
No matter what form the proposal takes, there are three 
principal benefits that marketization might bring. First, 
marketization would be a way to break the link between state 
financing and state control. Even if massive state subsidies are 
necessary to equalize educational opportunity, marketization 
may be expected to reduce state regulation by empowering the 
individual buyers-in this case the parents and guardians of 
children-in effect to regulate the providers of se~ces - the  
schools-through their collective action of giving business to 
the preferred providers. The regulation provided by a market 
approach arguably may be superior to direct state regulation 
because it is likely to result in greater flexibility than state 
regulation. Schools pursuing many different mixes of education- 
al goals will be able to coexist in the market as long as there 
are corresponding groups of buyers willing to spend their allo- 
cated resources in sufficient quantity to support these different 
kinds of schools. Second, one might also argue that competition 
is the best tool to stimulate creativity on the part of teachers 
and administrators. Thus we might attempt more and better 
experiments to improve the quality of education under a com- 
petitive system. Third, freeing each school to compete in this 
manner may make careers in education more desirable for 
dedicated teachers and administrators by grantihg them more 
autonomy in designing the educational curriculum than they 
would have under a system of rigorous state control. 
Because marketization proposals raise very complex ques- 
tions, a comprehensive review of these issues is beyond the 
scope of this article. Instead, this article concludes with a few 
51. For a description of various voucher plans, see generally YUDOF ET AL., su- 
pra note 2, at 420-38. 
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observations about the marketization of education in light of 
the foregoing discussion about the benefits and disadvantages 
of intermediate control structures for public education. First, 
marketization is indefensible if it does not embrace the concept 
of equality of educational opportunity as a guiding principle. I t  
follows, therefore, that marketization proposals should not nec- 
essarily be regarded as ways to reduce tax burdens for educa- 
tion because, like any proposal for reforming education in the 
United States, marketization proposals have to include sub- 
stantial wealth transfers to create greater equality of educa- 
tional opportunities. Whatever waste may currently exist be- 
cause of the lack of open competition among schools will likely 
be more than offset by the magnitude of the subsidy for the 
poor that is necessary to implement the principle of equality. 
However, if marketization proposals are able to garner sub- 
stantial public support, they may prove to be the best tool to 
pry out of the ever weary taxpaying public the funds necessary 
to provide an "adequate" education to all children in the United 
States. 
Second, marketization proposals also need to be scrutinized 
carefully with respect to the claim that they will reduce state 
regulation. Marketization cannot be expected to produce such 
an  effect unless, at a minimum, meaningful competition among 
schools is created. This is another reason that marketization 
plans have to  be accompanied by a form of vouchers to provide 
substantial subsidies for the poor. In addition, fostering effec- 
tive competition in many localities may require other kinds of 
public investment, such as improving and increasing the subsi- 
dies for public transportation. Even if there is adequate compe- 
tition to permit meaningful choice, the experience with private, 
for-profit schools suggests that state regulation must continue 
to set educational and social minimum standards and to guard 
consumers against fraud and similar kinds of abuse. 
Third, marketization plans are likely to reduce further the 
governance role of district school boards. The more expansive 
marketization plans would make school districts-and their 
school boards-largely irrelevant by permitting competition 
among schools across district lines. Even if competition is limit- 
ed to the school district, marketization seems likely to reinforce 
the trend toward moving local influence over educational policy 
from the district level to the level of the individual schools. 
Marketization plans are premised on the assumption that the 
individual schools should have significant autonomy so that 
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they are free to compete in the educational "market." The 
greater the autonomy of the local schools, the weaker the pow- 
er of the district school board to set educational policy. More- 
over, the individual schools will have an incentive to create 
parent-guardian advisory councils as a way of promoting cus- 
tomer satisfaction and loyalty. The result should be a shift in 
local control from the district level to the school level, just as in 
the case of "site-based management." 
Finally, if marketization permits private schools to compete 
with public ones, marketization seems likely to change the na- 
ture of the community within the school district. As a result, 
marketization can be expected to change somewhat the nature 
of civic participation at  the district school board level and to 
diminish the societal benefits of that participation. 
Marketization will change the nature of the community by 
virtue of the way market mechanisms affect personal relation- 
ships. The market mechanism is individualistic and atomistic, 
the very opposite of a communitarian vision of society. Markets 
are structured to give buyers power over the services offered in 
the market through the device of "exit," that is, by choosing to 
purchase from a different provider of services when they are 
dissatisfied with their current provider's services. When exit is 
quite expensive-as is generally true under our current system 
of publicly funded schools from which one can exit only by 
agreeing to pay tuition for a private education in addition to 
taxes for public education-then dissatisfied subjects of public 
education have a strong incentive t o  use "voice" as their control 
mechanism by publicly complaining and seeking to persuade 
school teachers, administration, and even the school board to 
make the changes they desire.52 
Non-market systems that force the participants to rely on 
"voice" would thus appear to be better designed to secure the 
putative benefits of intermediate structures than market sys- 
tems that facilitate control through "exit." Easy exit would 
52. The obligatory citation for the terms "exit" and "voicen is ALBEm 0 .  
HIRSCHMAN, Em, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). I, however, first learned of these 
terms through the very interesting application to financial systems in JOHN 
ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND GROWTH 57-95 (1983). 
Of course, some parents or guardians may have little opportunity for exit be- 
cause of their low level of education and their poverty and yet feel that they can- 
not exercise voice for the same reasons. Lack of opportunity to exit does not en- 
sure meaningful voice. It only means that the parties have a strong incentive to 
use voice. 
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appear t o  be especially inimical to the formation of community, 
yet in order to obtain meaningful competition in the market, 
exit has to be made fairly easy. In a community from which i t  
is relatively easy to exit, parties who hold very different views 
about the kind of education desirable are not necessarily com- 
pelled to negotiate with each other.53 The atomizing impact of 
the market may even minimize the benefits of community par- 
ticipation in advisory committees for the local schools since 
there, too, exit will provide an alternative to voice. Thus, in- 
stead of "schools for citizenship" and "seedbeds for republican 
virtue," marketization plans promise to create "schools for 
smart shopping." 
Marketization therefore cannot be expected to revitalize 
district school board control. I t  may produce a measure of sig- 
nificant local control over educational policy. However, to the 
extent that district school boards or local school advisory coun- 
cils play a role in the governance of marketized schools, one 
can expect that benefits to the political culture will be attenu- 
ated by the ready availability of exit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The traditional system of governing and financing the 
public schools through local community school districts thus 
cannot be salvaged. The inequality inherent in finance based 
on local district wealth is too pernicious to be tolerated any 
longer. To eliminate the gross disparities, substantial state- 
wide tax revenues are required. The options for control are 
then (1) greater centralized state control over the schools, (2) 
greater autonomy for individual schools with local control exer- 
cised, though probably only in a relatively weak fashion, 
through advisory councils for each school, or (3) marketization. 
I t  does not appear reasonable to expect that the local school 
boards can be given back substantial power over education, 
especially if significant state taxes are going to be used to elim- 
inate interdistrict funding disparities. 
The control issues will undoubtedly continue to be debated 
quite heatedly in the United States. The situation calls for bold 
experimentation." It seems that the dominant and character- 
53. Cf. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 68 (1987) ("Voucher plans at- 
tempt to avoid rather than settle our disagreements over how to develop demo- 
cratic character through schooling."). 
54. It is surprising to discover, for example, that a number of other countries 
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istic American tradition of skepticism toward bureaucracy will 
lead the nation t o  reject the first option. The second and third 
options both provide for some measure of local control, but this 
article has argued that the benefits to the political culture from 
such local control may not be large in either case. If that is so, 
there is little prospect of recreating a t  the level of individual 
schools the benefits for political life of the traditional system of 
self-governing district school boards. In any event, it seems 
clear that broad, meaningful control by the school boards them- 
selves cannot be revitalized. The desirability of local control 
being exercised by district school boards therefore no longer 
can justify the discrimination inherent in a system of school 
finance in which the determinative factor is the wealth of the 
local school district. 
This is not to argue that local school boards must necessar- 
ily be abolished. There may be a role for them to play (a) as a 
coordinator of the various schools in the district, or (b) as a 
shield protecting the administration and teaching staff from 
overly intrusive state government regulation. It is simply nec- 
essary to recognize that they do not and cannot in the future 
wield the kind of control that might justify insisting on the 
principle of local funding for the schools. Only then can the 
dark side of this intermediate structure be overcome by a genu- 
ine commitment to equality of educational opportunity in the 
United States. 
are experimenting with forms of marketization for primary and secondary educa- 
tion. The Danes are apparently the leaders in creating a free market in schools, 
but Great Britain and Singapore have also experimented with marketization plans 
recently. See A Survey of Education: Coming Top, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, Sup- 
plement, at 12-15. 
